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Introduction 
This chapter sheds light on the MNC as a contested transnational social space in the 
Balkan region of South East Europe by ‘deconstructing’ a recent ‘red’ joint venture 
from the perspectives of key stakeholders, ‘red’ referring to the location of the MNC 
in question in countries belonging to the former communist bloc. The organisational 
focus of our analysis is the Serbian brewery ‘Weisser’,1 the oldest brewery in the 
Balkans, situated near Belgrade, and recently acquired by the Turkish-owned MNC 
‘Eden’; the merger having taken place in an unstable and volatile environment, 
compared to a ‘tinderbox’ ready to ignite (Lee 2006). Through examining the merger 
from the grounded positions of key social actors – indigenous employees, union 
officials, local Serbian and ‘Westernised’ managers, exposed to new market-oriented 
logics emanating from the West, fuelled by globalisation – we discern both 
conflicting and consonant interests and rationalities relating to the establishment and 
early operations of the cross-border joint venture.  
Our study is informed by the work of Zgymunt Bauman (2000; 2007; Bauman 
and Vecchi 2004) on identity and Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1990a; 1990b) on the notion 
of ‘habitus’. Habitus is conceived by Bourdieu as the ingrained, socially constituted 
dispositions of social classes that lead actors to make choices and decisions that 
reproduce existing social structures and status distinctions, orienting their actions and 
inclinations without precisely determining them. We suggest that the habitus of 
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subsidiary managers and employees is at once shared, an extension of longstanding, 
traditional arrangements dating back to the socialist era, and at the same time 
dichotomous, with a new hiatus having opened up in the status of managers and 
workers which did not exist before, introducing new frictions to the relationship. This 
chapter turns the spotlight on conflictual micro-political issues within the newly-
acquired Serbian subsidiary, examining the diverse rationales and identities of key 
actors, whose interests are shaped and informed by the contexts in which they operate 
(Child and Rodrigues 1996; Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2006; Morgan and Kristensen 
2006). In this way, the chapter seeks to contribute to the further understanding of 
MNCs as complex micro-political systems spanning national, cultural, institutional, 
political and ethnic divides, and dominated by the interplay of power and politics 
(Clegg et al. 2006). 
  Much of the intrinsic interest of the present chapter derives from the fact that it 
is not concerned with a Western or North American MNC. The fact that Eden, the 
acquiring company, is Turkish is important. Turkey has enjoyed close historical links 
with the Balkans, stretching back for centuries. As a host nation, it eschews 
identification with the vast colonial projects of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in which Western countries engaged. It therefore taps into the notion of 
multiple modernities, free from association with the ‘all too common unidirectional 
managerial crusade from the West to the East’ (Kostera 2002: 115), while allowing 
for the emergence of other models (Kaya 2004; Lee 2006). Some commentators have 
tended to present MNCs as footloose and stateless (Ohmae 1990; Ohmae 1995), 
possessing an ‘internal market of mobile managers’ (Mueller 1994: 414). Many of the 
world’s biggest economic entities in terms of turnover are not in fact nation states but 
MNCs (Sklair 2002). Globalisation arguably calls into question the viability of 
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divergent types of capitalism (Crouch 2005), the expectation being that a US style of 
management might become diffused around the globe as the dominant paradigm. 
Other observers, however, lay greater emphasis on the differences between MNCs, 
arguing on the contrary that MNCs and the organisational processes they favour are 
heavily influenced by host country institutions, including industrial relations, 
education and financial systems (Whitley 1999; Djelic and Quack 2003; Geppert et al. 
2003; Harzing and Sorge 2003; Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2009; Tüselmann et al. 
2009). Viewed in this light, organisations and societies may be seen to mirror one 
another structurally, and markets are inseparable from their social contexts (Mueller 
1994; Quack et al. 2000; Maclean and Harvey 2008). This argument stresses the 
embeddedness of organisations in the societal fabric in which they have been 
constructed (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Clark and Soulsby 1998). Different 
countries of origin, as Ferner (2000) insists, lead to different patterns of control within 
MNCs. Harzing and Sorge (2003), indeed, suggest that divergence between MNCs of 
different countries of origin may actually be greater than assumed.  
Mahmed Kari, President and CEO of Eden, appears to support this argument, 
observing that for Turkish companies the Balkans represent a natural terrain in which 
to do business, offering cultural consonance, proximity to the West and (one day 
perhaps) entry to the European Union (EU): ‘An environment which might seem 
impossible to a Luxembourg company is business as usual to us’ (cited in Barrett 
2002: 21). For the Serbian subsidiary, Weisser, meanwhile, the cultural or 
‘institutional distance’ between the home and host country is arguably reduced with a 
Turkish parent than had the merger concerned a Western MNC (Morgan and 
Kristensen 2006: 1470). All of Eden’s subsidiaries at the time of the merger were in 
Central and Eastern Europe. A so-called ‘red’ multinational, Eden therefore afforded 
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more latitude for the Serbian subsidiary (Birkinshaw 1997), as well as an implicit 
cultural understanding and sensitivity, arguably conferring quasi-insider status on 
Eden’s Turkish managers, and promoting, in a notoriously low-trust environment, a 
far higher level of trust (Clark and Michailova 2004; Nojonen 2004).  
At the same time, the politically volatile Balkan region has received relatively 
scant attention in the field of international management (Barrett 2002; Hollinshead 
2006; Hollinshead and Maclean 2007; Gould and Sickner 2008). Harzing and Sorge 
(2003) have highlighted the need for more empirical research on previously neglected 
multinationals operating in Europe, while Michailova and Clark (2004: 9) have called 
for more ‘sensitising, inductive, bottom-up’ research to investigate organisation in 
post-socialist transforming societies. Our study seeks to address these gaps, casting 
light on issues of transnational and cultural idiosyncrasy in international business 
activity.  
In examining the diverse interests, identities and habitus of key actors 
involved in the strategic joint venture, this chapter addresses two principal research 
questions. First, what is the nature of the power base of local, indigenous managers in 
the Serbian subsidiary? And second, what is the nature of the relationship between 
subsidiary managers and workers, and to what extent might this be viewed as 
asymmetrical, founded on a habitus which is no longer shared but dichotomous?  
 
 Context 
The small state of Serbia provides a compelling context to study. In some respects it 
emerges as something of a special case within European post-socialist societies, at the 
forefront of reform until the late 1980s, yet thereafter experiencing economic and 
social devastation as a result of civil war, Western-imposed sanctions and the 
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fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia. Separated from the Republic of Montenegro 
following the Montenegrin referendum on independence in May 2006, it forms a 
small, landlocked country bordered by eight neighbouring states. Its population of just 
over 7 million is heterogeneous, comprising a majority of Serbs, in addition to, inter 
alia, Hungarians, Bosnians, Romany, Croats, Albanians and Slovaks. The declaration 
of independence by the southern province of Kosovo in February 2008 was endorsed 
by Western powers, but incited anti-Western sentiment amongst politicians and 
nationalistic-leaning members of the Serbian population. Kosovo contains a majority 
Albanian population, yet is regarded by many Serbians as their ‘ancestral home’. 
Relations between the two remain tense, exacerbated by allegations of human 
trafficking and drugs smuggling, with Serbia stubbornly refusing to recognise the 
fledgling state, even if this should become a condition of EU membership (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2008; Emerging Europe Monitor 2009). 
The delivery of indicted war criminals to stand trial in The Hague was 
stipulated as a condition for opening the doors to EU accession. In April 2008, Serbia 
signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), paving the way for the 
harmonisation of legislation and standards with the EU. The arrest of Radovan 
Karadzic in July 2008 after 13 years on the run was hailed as a ‘milestone’ by EU 
Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn; although Ratko Mladic, the principal 
perpetrator of the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, a designated UN ‘Safe Area’, at the 
time of writing remains at large (Obradovic-Wochnik 2009). For Serbia, as for other 
Balkan states, EU membership is seen as critical to future prosperity. The EU, 
however, exhausted from enlargement and constitutional reform, and ravaged by 
recession, may drag its feet. As Lee (2006: 11-12) insists, ‘the European Union needs 
to understand quickly it is solely the promise of membership that provides the impetus 
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in these countries for change’. A coalition of democratic, pro-European parties, For a 
European Serbia (ZES), led by Boris Tadic, took power in July 2008; though the 
ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party continues to enjoy the electoral support of 
around one third of the population. As Vujadinović (2004: 4) argues, Serbia stands 
today at a critical crossroads, ‘either to turn towards a future, modern, state in Europe, 
or to be pushed backwards to become an ever more traditionalist, xenophobic, isolated 
and prospectless entity’. 
In the years following the merger of Eden and Weisser in 2003, the macro-
economic environment remained poor. As Serbia embarked on a programme of rapid 
privatisation, including oil, electric power, mining, telecommunications and 
agriculture, injections of foreign capital were badly needed to propel economic 
generation. Yet continued political instability in the region, epitomised by the 
assassination in 2003 of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić, who had sought to stamp out 
organised crime, served as a disincentive to potential investors (Hadžić 2002; Ristić 
2004). At the time of writing, privatisation remains on-going, with Telekom Serbia, 
Belgrade Airport Nikola Tesla, and the pharmaceutical firm Galenika all expected to 
be put up for sale when the financial crisis abates (US Commercial Service Serbia 
2009). Privatisation has been facilitated by a joint venture or ‘flexible’ model, 
signifying privatisation through a strategic partnership, offering modernisation, new 
investment, and a boost to jobs and exports. The joint venture of Eden-Weisser (EW) 
with which we are concerned here was founded on this model of strategic 
relationship. Arguably, however, privatisation recipients have been denied the 
fundamental institutions of market democracy in an illiberal regime (Gould and 
Sickner 2008). Corruption levels have remained high, organised crime rife, and tax 
evasion and financial fraud commonplace (Gordy 2004). Strikes and social unrest are 
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forecast as industrial output slows, and the Serbian government makes stringent 
budget cuts – the price of having received IMF funds (Emerging Europe Monitor 
2009).  
Despite the faltering approach to reform taken by post-Milosević 
governments, some optimism has been generated through GDP growth of around 6 
per cent in recent years, and the provision of tax concessions to attract inward 
investment (US Commercial Service Serbia 2009). Serbia benefits from its 
geopolitical location as a ‘bridge’ between East and West, its highly skilled 
workforce, its central position in the Central Europe Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), 
and its economic relations with the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the World Bank 
estimated Serbia’s overall rank as a place in which to do business at just 86th in the 
world (out of 178 countries) in 2008. This compares relatively unfavourably with 
many other countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including Estonia (17th), 
Latvia (22nd), Lithuania (26th), Slovakia (32nd), Slovenia (55th) and the Czech 
Republic (56th) (World Bank 2008). 
This chapter is concerned with issues of power and politics in MNCs, more 
specifically within the parent-subsidiary relationship between the Turkish parent Eden 
and the Serbian subsidiary Weisser in the strategic joint venture established in 2003. 
Organisations are socially constituted, and social relationships in MNCs are 
institutionally embedded. Power, as Allen (2003: 2, cited in Clegg et al. 2006: 223) 
points out, is not a property but ‘a relational effect of social interaction’. It is a means 
of coordinating trans-organisational relationships. As such, power may be decentered, 
crossing transnational social spaces through ‘mediated relationships or through the 
establishment of a simultaneous presence’ (ibid.). Interdependent subunits within 
trans-organisational systems have a distribution of power often founded on the 
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division of labour (Hickson et al. 1971). On its own, however, power is arguably 
insufficient, requiring the presence of trust to work more effectively, reducing risk 
and enabling business relationships to rise above the state of homo homini lupus 
articulated by Hobbes (Bachmann 2001). Politics, meanwhile, as Hardy and Clegg 
assert (1996), is the process of mobilising power, and is a term not without negative 
connotations (Pettigrew 1973). Conflicts commonly display as resource-driven, 
interest-driven or identity-driven (Rothman and Friedman 2001; Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert 2006). The particular conflict with which we are concerned here, triggered 
when a ‘technological surplus agreement’ was implemented in the Serbian brewery, 
leading to a reduction in the workforce from 368 to 235 employees, is primarily 
resource-driven; but it also spills over on to issues of identity and habitus, as different 
fates are seen to befall different types of actor, unequally empowered, in the Serbian 
subsidiary. 
 
Identity and Habitus in an Uncertain World 
Identity, Bauman argues, was once largely determined by employment (Bauman and 
Vecchi 2004), as the high incidence of surnames relating to occupation, such as 
‘Smith’ (Schmidt, Forgeron) or ‘Miller’ (Müller, Meunier), across different societies 
reflects. This was arguably especially so in the former communist bloc, where 
individuals were assigned roles designed to match their abilities, at least in theory. 
More recently, however, with the transformation wrought by globalisation, we 
increasingly inhabit liquid times, in which ‘a stable identity [is] even more 
desperately sought after and more difficult to achieve’ (Bendle 2002: 16). Past 
certainties have given way to a new flexibility in the workplace, accentuating feelings 
of insecurity and disorientation (Bauman 2000; 2007). This is accompanied by a new 
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awareness that communities, once the bedrock of any society, are no longer 
indissoluble and welded together, but on the contrary are polycultural, variegated and 
shifting:  
 
One becomes aware that belonging’ and ‘identity’ are not cut in rock, that they 
are not secured by a lifelong guarantee, that they are eminently negotiable and 
revocable; and that one’s own decisions, the steps one takes, the way one 
acts… are crucial factors of both. In other words, the thought of ‘having an 
identity’ will not occur to people as long as ‘belonging’ remains their fate… 
(Bauman and Vecchi, 2004: 12). 
 
A primary characteristic of the accelerating liquefaction of social frameworks 
is that it implies a process of ‘disembedding without re-embedding’ (Bauman and 
Tester 2001: 89; Lee 2006: 357). The ‘disembedding’ of social institutions is viewed 
by Giddens (1991: 17) as a major influence on modernity. As the binding power of 
traditional social structures and ways of life ebbs away, agencies of collective action 
are swept aside by a new form of power, ‘increasingly mobile, slippery, shifty, 
evasive and fugitive’ (Bauman 2000: 14). The new, unpredictable and inexorably 
transient world left in its wake is marked by ‘the falling apart, the friability, the 
brittleness, the transience, the until-further-noticeness of human bonds and networks’ 
(ibid.), disembedding or ‘lifting out’ social relationships from their local contexts 
(Giddens 1991: 18), and instilling feelings of dissonance amongst the dispossessed 
(Bacharach et al. 1996; Lee 2006: 360; Hollinshead and Maclean 2007). As Bauman 
puts it, this is a world which ultimately ‘goes back on its promises’ (Bauman and 
Vecchi 2004: 52). The massive upheavals engendered by globalisation are by no 
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means restricted to the former communist bloc (Verdery 1996). But the socialist 
economies were particularly outmoded (Jowitt 1992), suggesting that the pernicious 
effects of the rapacious change driven by global capitalism may be felt there 
especially keenly. This was exacerbated in the case of Serbia due to the upheavals it 
had experienced, including the economic collapse of the country in the 1990s, UN 
sanctions, NATO bombings, and shock therapy privatisation.  
Habitus, for Bourdieu, is a system of lasting, transposable dispositions, 
informed by the earliest experiences of childhood. It serves as a system of cognitive 
and motivating structures which orient and direct the individual. As such it provides 
the individual with a practical sense of how to act, suggesting ‘procedures to follow, 
paths to take’, albeit without entirely predetermining these (Bourdieu 1990a: 53; 
Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Maclean et al., 2010). As a ‘product of history’ (ibid: 
54), both individual and collective, being rooted in a present past which extends into 
the future, it is understandable that an individual’s notion of habitus might be deeply 
affected by the growing instability of a post-traditionalist, individualising society 
(Adams 2006). Habitus, Sweetman (2003: 532) observes, ‘is a product of our 
upbringing and more particularly of our class’. Identities, in this sense, are often 
‘classed’ (Bourdieu 1977); though to identify with a class, one needs to prove one’s 
membership continually through deeds, otherwise one risks becoming déclassé 
(Bauman and Vecchi 2004: 49). Viewed in this light, a more accurate definition of 
class or stratification, Bottero (2004) suggests, might be the ability or otherwise to 
escape from the field. In this regard, the experience and prospects of the subsidiary 
managers and the indigenous workers in our case study below are revealed as 
dichotomous. While the former are able to exercise a degree of choice and agency, 
and a measure of control over the direction and development of their careers, the latter 
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lack both choice and agency, emerging as powerless to influence their employment 
(other than through the ‘Hobson’s choice’ of exit).  
Relations between management and workforce, of course, are normally 
asymmetrical. The point to stress here, however, is that in a former socially-owned 
production plant, this would not necessarily have been the case, the Yugoslav self-
management model – characterised by state control yet endowed with a measure of 
decentralisation and imbued with an ethos of equality – which obtained during the 
Tito era being regarded as something of an ideal type in terms of employee 
participation.  
In the elaborate setting of a transnational MNC, it is also clear that issues of 
power and control are rendered more complex across borders, giving rise to a subtle 
interplay of informal and formal power relations between parent and subsidiary 
(Ferner 2000; Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). Informal systems in the subsidiary and 
the power relations they represent are magnified in importance, since the MNC 
actually needs local managers to function, to occupy crucial bridging roles (as Cerdin 
et al. explore in the present volume) as ‘cultural go-betweens’ or as ‘interpreters’ of 
the local context (Ferner 2000: 530). This may result in a potential disjunction 
between the formal system of rules endorsed by the MNC and the practical operation 
of the system at local, subsidiary level. At the same time, low-power subsidiary actors 
may enhance their power resources vis-à-vis the parent company through such 
informal means, enabling them to increase their influence over time, potentially at 
least (Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). 
 Nevertheless, this cannot disguise the fact that in this relationship, and 
notwithstanding the tendency of the foreign-owned subsidiary to engage in strategies 
to enhance its influence with the parent over time, the power resources available to 
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parent and subsidiary are inherently unequal. Internal competition may exist between 
different sister subsidiaries, which are effectively in competition with one another for 
resources from the parent company. It may even suit the parent to allow a particular 
subsidiary to decline while the capabilities of others are strengthened through 
additional investment (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998). Ultimately, the parent may 
choose subsidiary divestment (Boddewyn 1979; 1983). All of this instills a 
fundamental asymmetry at the heart of the relationship between the two parties 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). At Weisser, this asymmetry arguably existed on two 
main levels, between the MNC headquarters (HQ) and subsidiary management on the 
one hand, and between the subsidiary management and its workforce on the other. 
 
Research process 
The fieldwork for the present study was conducted by one of the authors of this 
chapter, with the assistance of a Serbian academic. The involvement of a native 
academic proved to be invaluable to the research process. Gaining access to 
organisations in transitional economies is often difficult for Western ‘outsiders’. 
Local participation helped the Western researchers to adjust to the culture and politics 
of the company under investigation, with the Serbian academic acting as a cultural 
informant, while enhancing their acceptability to insiders (Clark and Michailova 
2004; Soulsby 2004). The Serbian academic also assisted with simultaneous 
translation during interviews with employees – thereby slowing down the questioning 
at times, and allowing the researchers an opportunity to observe respondents’ 
reactions to particular areas of questioning (Soulsby 2004) – while helping to 
authenticate ideas and findings emerging from the research. 
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Invariably the researchers themselves contribute to the milieu of the research 
environment, impacting on the social contexts under study (Johnson and Duberley 
2003). This is arguably particularly the case in conditions of societal transience. 
Soulsby (2004) argues that it is important not to stereotype respondents as passive 
beings, whilst assuming the researchers to be neutral, unobtrusive observers to 
proceedings. The reality may be starkly different, the researchers occupying a critical 
position in the research process which deserves to be acknowledged (Steger 2004), at 
times even creating quite a stir in the transitioning case organisation, becoming 
‘objects of curiosity and discussion’ among the workforce (Soulsby 2004: 50).  
The fieldwork for the present study was based upon three sets of semi-
structured interviews, conducted in Belgrade and the brewery in Pančevo, 10 miles 
from the capital, in the course of three separate visits to Serbia during 2004 and 2005. 
The first set of interviews took place in Belgrade in May 2004, and involved five in-
depth semi-structured interviews with Serbian experts and government officials in the 
privatisation process. The purpose of these interviews was twofold: first, to gain 
technical insights into the privatisation process; and second, to acquire qualitative 
observations regarding the speed of privatisation and the principle and practice of 
foreign ownership in a country where, until recently, all industry had been state 
owned (cf. Howard 2001). Insights provided by interviewees, and derived from 
related published material, helped to sharpen the authors’ understanding of the 
political and economic setting of the case study (Lofland and Lofland 1995).  
The second set of interviews was conducted at the Weisser Brewery near 
Belgrade in February and March 2005, and involved semi-structured interviews with 
senior managers, including the Human Resource Manager, Company Lawyer, 
Production Manager and the Sales Manager. These managers served as key internal 
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informants, providing valuable information on the case study organisation, and acting 
as ‘guides to insider understandings’ (Lofland and Lofland 1995: 61, cited in Soulsby 
2004: 50), especially necessary in a post-socialist transitional setting. The purpose of 
these interviews was both to acquire factual information concerning the organisational 
effects of the takeover by Eden, and to obtain reflective observations from the 
managers concerned regarding their personal experience of the joint venture, and the 
nature of the strategic relationship between Weisser and Eden. The interviewees 
spoke in English, an indication of their education and international experience, 
obviating the need for translation. 
The final set of interviews took place at the Weisser Brewery in May 2005, 
involving six lay representatives of the trade union Nezavisnost, which represented a 
majority of the workers. The purpose of this interview (which involved all six 
individuals concurrently) was to gain the benefit of worker perceptions as to the 
organisational implications of the takeover at shop-floor level, and to elicit their 
feelings as to the future prospects of Weisser. Interviewing low-power actors in an 
MNC in a post-socialist transitional setting in this way is relatively uncommon 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008), and strengthens the grass-roots, bottom-up aspect of 
the present study (Clark and Soulsby 1999; Michailova and Clark 2004). The 
interviewees spoke in their native Serbian, with simultaneous translation provided by 
the Serbian academic. The approach adopted by the researchers in all cases was 
informed by Weber’s notion of Verstehen, seeking to access the different cultures of 
respondents through a heightened understanding, thereby gaining first-hand insight 
into their perceptions, interests and contexts (Johnson and Duberley 2003). 
Following Czarniawska (1998: 47), we believe it is important to hear and heed 
the ‘voices of the field’. Kostera (2002: 113) gives poignant expression to the 
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fundamental importance of doing so, stressing the need to ‘give voice to the fears, 
dreams and struggles of people who have entrusted me with stories about them’. This 
is especially necessary in a world which, as Bauman highlights, seems intent on going 
back on its promises – as exemplified by the subsequent demise of the Weisser 
brewery in 2008, its few remaining employees subsumed into the sister subsidiary at 
Zaječar.  
 
The Internationalisation of Brewing 
The brewing sector has seen dramatic shifts in ownership in recent years, away from 
indigenous interests and towards internationalised cadres of professional managers. 
Serbia represents an increasingly important market for Europe’s major groups, not 
least because per capita consumption is still relatively low, with scope for 
improvement. Total Serbian beer consumption per capita stands at around 60 litres per 
annum, compared with an equivalent volume in neighbouring Croatia and Slovenia of 
around 75 litres and 100 litres respectively. There were twelve breweries in Serbia at 
the outset of this study, all previously state or socially owned, but which rapidly 
became subject to foreign ownership; within a matter of years, however, several of 
these had closed. The Belgian MNC Interbrew entered a strategic partnership with the 
Apatinska Pivara brewery in Apatin in 2003, acquiring ownership of 50 per cent of its 
shares. Interbrew also acquired a major stake in Niksicka Pivara. Carslberg and 
Celarevo Pivara became strategic partners in October 2003, with the Danish giant 
acquiring 51 per cent of the brewery’s shares. Belgrade-based Beogradsku Indusrija 
Piva (BIP), in combination with Vrsacka and Jagodinska breweries, was privatised 
and purchased by Dutch MNC Heineken. The Turkish-owned beverage group Eden, 
meanwhile, bought up two Serbian breweries in 2003-2004: Weisser, the subject of 
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this study, in August 2003, followed by a second brewery, Sava, at Zaječar the year 
after, which thereby became the sister subsidiary of Weisser. Within a short time of 
these takeovers, the total annual brewing capacity of the two breweries had risen to 
1.4 million hectoliters – 0.4 million hectoliters in Pančevo and 1 million hectoliters in 
its sister subsidiary in Zaječar.  
  
The Joint Venture 
The Parent: Eden 
Eden is an 85 per cent subsidiary of Turkish-owned food and beverage producer Eden 
Ark, a system of companies producing and marketing beer, malt and soft drinks 
across a territory ranging from the Adriatic to China, consisting of 14 breweries, four 
malteries, and nine Coca Cola bottling facilities across 10 countries. To date, Eden 
Ark has exhibited a pronounced strategic orientation towards Central and Eastern 
Europe, its field of operations concentrating on Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Romania, Moldova as well as Serbia. State-of-the-art brewing facilities in Moscow 
were developed with the assistance of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), which contributed a €20 million loan in 2001. The group is 
amongst the ten largest European brewers by sales volume. In 1989, Eden Ark group 
management set itself a long-term goal to generate 50 per cent of its beer sales 
internationally by 2004, an objective it achieved in 2003, a year ahead of target.  
 
The Subsidiary: Weisser 
 
At the time of our study, Weisser was the oldest brewery in Serbia, having been 
established in May 1722. A critical stage in its development occurred at the end of the 
nineteenth century, when a German family, Weisser, took charge and developed the 
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first steam brewery. The brewery’s international connections were useful in learning 
brewing techniques from abroad, particularly from Austria and Germany.  
During the Tito era, Weisser was nationalised, family ownership giving way to 
the socialistic organisational form of ‘social ownership’. Accordingly, while the state 
remained a powerful actor in the process, the brewery was nevertheless owned by the 
workers themselves and managed by their representatives. In 1970, the brewery 
became a subsidiary entity within the Hamis holding company, which also possessed 
interests in agriculture and other sectors. In the 1980s, Weisser enjoyed rapid 
development and increased capacity, serving markets in Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Croatia through the establishment of distribution centres in these 
regions. In June 1989, Weisser became a legal entity through the provisions of the 
first law on companies.  
During the 1990s, however, in common with other Yugoslav enterprises, 
Weisser suffered as a result of war and UN sanctions. Indeed, the community 
surrounding the brewery was particularly badly affected by NATO bombings, which 
caused the local refinery to leak carcinogens into the environment. As well as losing 
valuable markets as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, the brewery was unable to 
attract new investment from government or to import new technology and equipment. 
Nevertheless, there remained a sustained demand for beer throughout the period of 
crisis, and local producers held a stranglehold over the market. 
In 1991, the brewery became one of the first privatising organisations in 
Serbia, with shareholders acquiring 60 per cent of socially owned capital. This figure 
was raised to 90 per cent seven years later, in 1998, as a result of the new privatisation 
and transformation law. Accordingly, although the general assembly overseeing the 
company continued to comprise of appointed individuals, the general manager 
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operated in a relatively independent capacity, with a primarily professional, as 
opposed to political, orientation. 
 
The Process of Merging 
Heralding the new joint venture, Eden-Weisser (hereafter referred to in its shortened 
form as Weisser), in August 2003, the President and CEO of Eden Ark, Mahmed 
Kari, stated: ‘We will integrate Weisser’s 250 years of brewing heritage with Eden’s 
proven technological as well as marketing capabilities to be a leading brewer in 
Serbia. We will act with speed to fully leverage our advantage of being the first 
international brewer to enter Serbia’. Eden acquired a 63 per cent stake in Weisser 
through its acquisition of €6.5 million. This was followed in 2004 by a further 
investment of €5 million. The new owner also repaid the brewery’s debt to the state of 
€3 million. Fresh capital injected into the joint enterprise was used to enhance product 
quality and the technical infrastructure of the brewery. Subsequent important 
developments included the introduction of pasteurisation, product rebranding through 
the use of a new logo, the reshaping of bottles and crates, and the introduction of new 
plastic bottles. In December 2003, the company’s main ‘Weisser’ brand was 
relaunched, followed by strong marketing support. 
In the case study which follows, we pick up the story following the 
implementation of a ‘technological surplus agreement’ in 2003, which had the effect 
of reducing the workforce from 368 to 235 employees in the first instance. In 
agreement with Nezavisnost and a smaller independent trade union recognised at the 
brewery, and in accordance with the relevant labour laws and collective agreements, 
surplus staff were redeployed or transferred wherever possible. Eden set aside €1 
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million to pay the 133 redundant workers, each of whom received €330 (before tax) 
for every year of service at the brewery.  
 
Contesting Social Space from Grounded Perspectives 
The locus of our study in Serbia, which may be considered an ‘extreme variant’ of 
other post-socialist settings (Eisenhardt 1989; Hollinshead and Maclean 2007), 
arguably offers the potential for distinctive, and perhaps idiosyncratic, analysis of the 
structuring of the strategic interactions of the social actors involved in the 
international joint venture (Crozier and Friedberg 1980). As highlighted by the 
present volume, recent departures in the study of MNCs depict the MNC as a site of 
micro-political contestation and pluralistic tension (Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2006; 
Morgan and Kristensen 2006; Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2009), rather than as a nexus 
of bounded rationality – the result of a ‘clash between different actors within the firm 
utilizing resources derived from their institutional and organizational context to 
pursue their own agendas’ (Morgan and Kristensen 2006: 1468). In keeping with this 
theme, we seek to expose the basis for micro-political ‘game playing’ (Doz and 
Prahalad 1991) on the part of key organisational actors by reflecting upon their 
primary interests and grounded positions.  
 
The Parent: Cost and Cultural Consonance  
While access to senior managers of the Turkish parent company Eden Ark was not 
available, the authors were able to gain insight into the strategic motivation of the 
Turkish-owned ‘red’ MNC from secondary and web-based sources. In a published 
interview with the company’s Marketing Director in October 2002, the following 
statement was made: 
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We are the major player in Turkey, but that will not be enough in the future. 
Especially when Turkey eventually becomes part of the EU and we will not 
have the protection of the monopoly system. We already produce Becks and 
Miller beer under license in Turkey, as one means of avoiding too many 
competition concerns when Turkey joins the EU, but we need to do more to 
ensure that our business continues to thrive after that date. We have focused 
on Eastern Europe for one main reason – money invested there goes a lot 
further than it does in the West. Of course, Turkey has also had traditional 
links with that part of Europe as well, so it makes it the ideal place to start 
expanding sales of Eden. (FoodandDrink.com 2004) 
 
The importance for cultural consonance between home and host environments 
is underlined also by Barrett (2002: 21), who points out that whereas US or European 
investors were put off the entire Balkan region by repeated televised images of war, 
investors from more proximate countries, in contrast, formed a more realistic picture 
of the possibilities for doing business there. As Barrett explains, ‘The whole 
environment was more familiar to them. They had historical links – the Hapsburg 
Empire once stretched into today’s Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, while Turks occupied 
much of the area for hundreds of years. History fosters cultural links that facilitate 
contacts and even trust between business people’ (ibid.)   
In analysing the strategic intent of Eden Ark in Serbia, it is evident that the 
potential for building a normative ‘bridge’ through the subsidiary provides a powerful 
rationale for initiating the joint venture. This corroborates the assertion by Martinez 
and Jarillo (1991) that ‘cultural consonance’ serves to lubricate the dynamics of the 
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parent-subsidiary relationship, particularly given the contextual specificities of the 
Balkan region. It is, of course, also the case that Eden Ark’s interest in the area is 
driven by a powerful economic logic: the lure of cheap, skilled labour (Barrett 2002). 
A concomitant of this economic rationality, however, is an underlying political 
‘asymmetry’ in the power relationship between MNCs and local stakeholders, 
including government, in the post-socialist region (Clark and Geppert, 2006). The 
structural weighting of power in favour of the MNC is heightened in the Serbian case 
by the retarded macro-economic status of the country and the general climate of 
political volatility. This was borne out by our interviews with privatisation officials, 
who revealed that a primary governmental concern was to relieve the debts incumbent 
upon the state by selling off publicly-owned enterprises to foreign buyers at 
artificially low prices as rapidly as possible; Eden being a direct beneficiary of this 
process. The Serbian government unquestionably falls into the bracket of ‘low-
influence national governments’ referred to by Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008: 478). 
As a low-power actor in its own right, in need of funds from privatisation and inward 
investment, it can do little to bolster the status and influence of indigenous actors in 
foreign-owned Serbian subsidiaries.   
 
Local Management: Managing in a Zone of Uncertainty 
As the protocol for merging was formulated, a ‘transition team’ of senior managers 
from Eden Ark and Weisser were appointed to steer the process of organisational 
integration, replacing the former senior management team. The team included the 
former General Manager at Weisser, as well as legal, sales, technical and finance 
managers. It was joined, on a project-by-project basis, by temporary expatriate experts 
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offering assistance and advice on matters such as information technology and quality 
control.  
At the time of the first set of interviews at the premises, eighteen months after 
the takeover, the transition team had been replaced by a new team of managers at 
what was now called Eden Weisser, following the joint venture. Although the General 
Manager, appointed immediately after the establishment of the joint venture, was of 
Belgian nationality, having been recruited from the senior ranks of the Belgian-owned 
MNC Interbrew, the majority of senior management team at EW was of Serbian 
origin, from Belgrade, with good local knowledge of the region. All three out of the 
four top managers interviewed (excepting the Company Lawyer who was a time-
served employee at Weisser) were relatively young business graduates of Serbian 
higher educational institutions. All had ‘worked their way up’ in other MNC drinks 
producers based in Serbia, one (the Human Resource Manager) at Coca Cola and two 
(the Plant Manager and Sales Manager) at Interbrew. The Plant Manager had acquired 
significant international managerial experience in the sector, having worked for some 
time for Interbrew in Belgium and the UK. All three were fluent in the English 
language. In classifying the new cadre of managers at Weisser, they were clearly 
professional and specialist practitioners, who, although Serbian nationals, had 
acquired through their international experience extensive command of their functional 
areas. Their appointment effectively marked a final end to the legacy of worker self-
management which had characterised the brewery during the Tito era. 
Our primary focus in interviews with local managers was on their perceptions 
of the degree of control exerted by the parent on the subsidiary, and their consequent 
room for manoeuvre with regard to initiatives (Birkinshaw 1997). All management 
interviewees were asked about the frequency and form of contact they experienced 
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with representatives of the parent in Istanbul. The Production Manager, who was also 
responsible for coordinating the financial investment from Eden, contrasted the 
rigorous scrutiny he had experienced whilst working at Interbrew with what he 
described as the greater room for flexibility and autonomy permitted by Eden: ‘We 
discuss everything with them, but they leave us to develop things for ourselves, and 
for me that is the right way of doing things, because I know this market much better 
than people sitting in Eden’. This was due, he maintained, not just to the smaller size 
of Eden Ark (owning 14 breweries at the time as opposed to the 300 owned by 
Interbrew), but also to the cultural compatibility resulting from Eden Ark’s East 
European origins and zone of operations. According to the Plant Manager, a ‘positive’ 
form of monitoring by the parent was apparent whereby it always ‘kept an eye on 
you’. This was understandable, he explained: ‘They are never going to leave me 
alone, because this is a property of theirs’. At the same time, the parent had 
confidence in the work of local managers, and was prepared to delegate to them and 
allow them to ‘formulate their own strategies’. The Plant Manager explained that he 
had frequent conversations with his line manager at Eden, which were typically 
cordial, covering subjects such as the weather and holidays, but which were also 
focused on the achievement of pre-set targets and deadlines, betraying the existence 
of a tighter leash. This included ‘reporting to them every day about how much we sold 
yesterday’.  
Despite the Weisser team being able to develop plans and policies ‘in a 
personal way’, the Group Sales Manager at Eden monitored results rigorously, 
expecting daily reporting on sales volumes. In addition, if the subsidiary wished to 
stage a large promotion or event, costing in the region of €100,000, it was necessary 
to gain Eden approval. There is clearly a tension here between what the subsidiary 
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managers describe as decentralised control and evidence of quite detailed surveillance 
by HQ. 
Whilst the above conversations indicated that, at the very least, a ‘soft’ form 
of corporate control was being exerted by the parent over subsidiary managers in an 
organisational climate of relative cultural consonance (Larsson et al. 2004), it 
nevertheless became clear that local managers were mobilising tacit and culturally 
specific non-transferable knowledge resources to optimise their organisational 
legitimacy (Gertler 2003). The following observations from local managers are 
instructive in this regard. 
 According to the Sales Manager, it was necessary for him to convey to his 
team that the Serbian market was different from the rest of the world. Macro-
economic and political instability created an environment which was highly charged 
and rapidly changing, with a high risk of inflation and devaluation. Furthermore, it 
needed to be understood that business dealings were not always conducted with 
propriety, a major problem being delays in payment for delivered items: ‘Payment 
conditions are 60 days or 90 days, and I’m collecting my money in three months, but I 
have to pay tax and excise in advance’. Since his appointment in 2003, the Sales 
Manager had concentrated on building up the sales profile of EW from a very low 
base, Weisser having been in debt, and having failed to invest in branding and 
marketing. In conjunction with the previous Human Resource Manager, the Sales 
Manager had recruited a sales force from scratch by 2004, covering all major Serbian 
sub-regions, and embracing Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Members of the 
sales force were typically inhabitants of major Serbian cities, who had experience and 
a good track record in sales, and who were committed to forming a ‘chain’ between 
EW and customers in a direct and personal fashion. One activity, for example, was to 
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visit stores to observe and negotiate the position of Weisser beers on shelves: ‘You 
have to fight for the market every single day, to get a good position on a shelf in a 
store’. In gradually building the market, it was necessary for the EW sales team to be 
acutely aware of distinctive Serbian tastes in beer, which could be discovered through 
market research and ‘blind’ tasting. According to the Sales Manager: ‘You have to 
adapt to the market if you want to survive, if you do not you will die in two months’.  
The Human Resource Manager and Company Lawyer had been primarily 
involved in introducing the programme of employment changes at EW following the 
takeover by Eden. The single most significant development had been the 
technological surplus agreement which involved a workforce reduction of over one 
third. This agreement had been implemented with adherence to Serbian employment 
law and established collective agreements, as mentioned, which require consultation 
on matters such as redundancy and levels of compensation, as well as providing for 
the redeployment of redundant workers where possible for a period of three years. 
Thus, a number of redundant workers retained their association with the brewery, 
including former drivers who bought trucks with severance pay and thereafter 
operated on a self-employed basis.  
Thus, a vital strategic contribution of the Human Resource team had been to 
ensure that Serbian employment law was properly applied in change programmes, the 
law remaining the primary determinant of the substance of the employment 
relationship. Accompanying the administration of the more technical aspects of 
change, the newly established HR department devoted considerable attention to 
communicating and explaining new policies to workplace representatives in a manner 
which took account of distinctive Serbian expectations and sensibilities. Thus, 
following Clark and Geppert (2006), a vital attribute to enable local managers to 
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negotiate and uphold their social space within the enterprise was aptitude for learning. 
This strikes a chord with the arguments presented in the chapter by Williams and 
Geppert, who underline the importance of national resources, including employment 
laws, to provide actors with social space in MNCs. In the Serbian plant, however, this 
space seemed rather limited, despite their protestations to the contrary. These 
managers were walking something of a tightrope, having to combine effectively two 
distinct forms of knowledge. Firstly, through their dealings with the parent, and 
through their accumulated experience of Western companies and educational/training 
institutions, they needed to demonstrate ideological acceptance and proficiency in the 
application of ‘universal’ Western management concepts in the fields of strategy, 
production, HRM and so on. Secondly, in order to functionalise the peculiarities of 
operating in the ‘insecurity zone’ (Crozier and Friedberg 1980), they needed to 
capitalise on the rare, tacit and inimitable knowledge resources derived from their 
subjective experience of the uniquely challenging and potentially impenetrable 
Serbian institutional and cultural milieu (Gertler 2003). It was through the competent 
personal mixing of these discrete knowledge repertoires that the Serbian managers 
could maximise their organisational status and career opportunities.  
Thus, in seeking to understand the micro-political ‘game playing’ occurring 
between parent and subsidiary management groupings, we should recognise that, in 
an organisational and macro-political climate of considerable asymmetry, local 
managers were nevertheless seemingly able to protect some valuable social space 
within the enterprise by mobilising two primary knowledge-based resources. Firstly, 
Westernised managerial and technical acumen was required to ensure competitiveness 
in the new market-orientated business environment. Demonstration to the parent of 
profitability would allow indigenous managers considerable latitude within a 
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relatively high-trust, culturally consonant parent-subsidiary relationship (Ferner 
2000). Secondly, in pursuit of the above, local managers could bolster their positions 
in inimitable fashion through the interpretation (Ferner 2000; Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert 2006) of universalistic fields of managerial knowledge in the highly 
particularistic Serbian business context. 
 
Employee Interests: the Expression of Dissonance 
While the social space between parent and subsidiary managers possessed a ‘loose- 
tight’ dynamic, a conditional degree of latitude being permitted to host country 
management, within the enterprise itself a widening gulf of contested social space was 
opening up between local managers and the organisational rank and file. It was the 
latter grouping that bore the brunt of the asymmetrical power distribution by the 
parent and its associated cost-cutting agenda, the victims of a ‘hollowing out of 
democratic institutions and the privatization of the public sphere’ (Bauman and 
Vecchi 2004: 5), which they were effectively powerless to resist. While the 
particularistic and tacit skills of the elevated managerial cadres in the enterprise were 
of value to the parent, the technical skills and proficiencies of (particularly older) 
production workers were viewed as dispensable. It is instructive to reflect briefly on 
the ‘workers’ story’, conveyed during the third phase of fieldwork and second visit to 
the brewery. 
Taking issue with management’s perspective on the takeover, the worker 
representatives stated that a climate of secrecy had prevailed at Weisser, with little 
information having been forthcoming on specific work changes or the future direction 
of the business. Indeed, it was alleged that important financial data had been 
manipulated to bolster the interests of the incoming management. The lay officials of 
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the union Nezavisnost asserted that the Weisser brewery had been undervalued to 
reduce its purchase price, thus lessening the value of payments due to workers 
according to their status as ‘social owners’. At the same time, Eden had allegedly 
changed the product, reducing the quality of the beer, which likewise had the effect of 
lowering the value of the factory. Furthermore, it was alleged that the profitability of 
the enterprise, now highly productive according to the workers, was continually 
underestimated in order to justify low average pay for workers (approximately €150 
per month, a sum too low to live on, compared to €1,300 for managers).  
Turning to the technological surplus agreement, although severance pay had 
been acceptable by Serbian standards, allegedly the process of selection had been far 
from ethical. According to these representatives, ‘psychological pressure’ had been 
brought to bear on many older workers to quit; these time-served individuals, who 
possessed greater legal and social protection at work, being replaced with student 
workers denied pension or employment rights. ‘New’ machinery that had been 
introduced was in fact second hand, as one employee reported: ‘A lot of what is 
coming is used machinery, it’s not new. It’s imported from Germany or somewhere. 
It’s all used. Only the plastic bottling machine is new’. The temporary workers 
employed in the subsidiary were ill equipped to use this machinery, producing 
inefficiencies and creating something of a hazard.  
Turning to broader issues concerning organizational culture, the worker 
representatives referred to the higher, managerial stratum of the brewery as ‘Eden’, 
indicating a perceived dichotomy in identity between themselves and the incoming 
professional cadres, despite their predominantly Serbian nationality. If the new and 
youthful management grouping were offensive to a workforce steeped in the 
principles of self-management, this was exacerbated by the removal of social benefits 
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which had been enjoyed prior to the takeover. According to the representatives: ‘We 
used to get free sport and other welfare assistance, but now there is nothing’.  
Thus, at a micro-political level, profound changes had occurred in the 
configuration of social spaces within the enterprise following the merger. Previous 
notions of egalitarianism and collectivism in the enterprise, binding management and 
workers together as a legacy of socialism, had given way to a polarisation of power 
and status. Although a productive and reciprocal normative relationship was now 
enjoyed by parent and subsidiary managers as a product of newly negotiated 
knowledge repertoires, workers tended to operate in a cognitive and normative 
organisational ‘black hole’, giving rise to feelings of helplessness. A comment by one 
shop steward is insightful, revealing the workers as feeling adrift and bereft following 
a string of broken promises: 
 
Before Eden came there was good communication in the factory. We all 
decided together, management and workers, about everything… now we are 
happy to have the possibility to work, end of story. We can’t plan anything. 
Nobody knows what will happen tomorrow. Social security doesn’t exist. 
Although we have been promised everything, including apartments and 
schools, nothing has happened. We have had a bad experience with promises.  
 
At the same time, the representatives pointed to the sister subsidiary at 
Zaječar, Sava, which had received very different treatment from the parent company, 
and where the workers had benefitted from far higher redundancy payments: ‘Eden 
bought another company in Serbia, and the workers were much happier. The workers 
in other companies had a better agreement, a better deal, averaging €40,000 based on 
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shares. But Pančevo workers didn’t get the shares. They got some shares, but the 
value of them was very small, around €300’. By the time of our third field visit to the 
brewery, the plant had become much less active, prompting the researchers to reflect 
that things could not go on in this way. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to our understanding of MNCs as complex micro-political 
systems, dominated by the interplay of power and politics, by turning the spotlight on 
a ‘red’ joint venture in Serbia, which manifests both universal as well as 
particularistic tendencies in international organisational behaviour. Reflecting on 
‘cultural consonance’ as a lubricating force in the devolution of strategic authority, it 
is clear that the normative factors that contribute to such consonance possess regional 
specificity. Thus, a Turkish-owned corporation was prepared to overlook ethnic 
tensions and political volatility as a serious risk factor in the host environment, in a 
situation where a Western corporation might have demonstrated a more cautious 
approach, highlighting the power of history and the cultural empathies it spawns as a 
precursor to international business activity and understanding, suggestive of a strong 
country-of-origin effect (Ferner 2000; Harzing and Sorge 2003; Tüselmann et al. 
2009). The Turkish-owned company was clearly prepared to give the brewery the 
benefit of the doubt in its investment decision. However, in a context of political and 
institutional fragility, our study would suggest that the MNC is bound to place a 
particular, perhaps exceptional, reliance on locally based and tacit indigenous 
knowledge. Viewed in this light, the MNC may be particularly compelled, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, to devolve strategic authority to ‘savvy’ local managers in 
politically and institutionally uncertain environments. 
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Returning to our first research question specified above, it is clear that the 
power base of Serbian managers in the subsidiary was essentially fivefold. In the first 
place, the indigenous managers demonstrated prodigious language proficiency (cf. 
Ferner 2000). One, indeed, had begun his career as a translator, a role he abandoned 
as soon as practicable, but which had nonetheless served as the basis of his corporate 
career. In contrast, language proficiency was something the workers were singularly 
lacking, confining the latter to a relatively low-power position in the enterprise 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). Secondly, the local managers possessed a striking 
familiarity with Western management discourse, demonstrating a formidable mastery 
of its concepts and practices. The ‘tool kit’ of Western managerial concepts which 
they had built up and assimilated allowed them to converse fluently, employing up-to-
date management rhetoric in their day-to-day roles with reference to strategy, 
marketing and HRM, as evinced by their use of such terms as ‘key performance 
indicators’, or a new style of work based on ‘polyvalence’. The third source of power 
on which local managers were able to draw was their wide-ranging experience, 
combining internationally acquired knowledge of new techniques to do with, for 
example, downsizing with their aforementioned fluency in management rhetoric. This 
experience had been acquired through management training programmes as well as 
through time served with other MNCs. Fourthly, they were able to consolidate their 
power base through their local knowledge of the Serbian market, as exemplified by 
the Sales Manager’s efforts to secure top-shelf positions for Weisser beer in local 
supermarkets. In contrast, expatriate managers from the parent company would have 
been incapable of managing the realities of selling the product at this practical, grass-
roots level, essentially giving local managers a monopoly in this regard. And finally, 
the Serbian managers had accumulated varying degrees of social capital acquired 
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during their employment at Eden or other drinks MNCs, providing them with an 
international network of useful contacts and acquaintances on which they were able to 
draw (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1997). 
The local subsidiary managers interviewed were able to exploit this repertoire 
of power sources in various different ways. In particular, they were able to marry 
together their grasp of newly acquired, ‘Western’ managerial techniques with a deep-
seated tacit knowledge of local culture, and, at the same time, a more traditional, 
Serbian, pluralistic concept of enterprise. This was underlined in particular by the HR 
Manager, who at interview displayed a strong grasp of concepts such as downsizing 
while simultaneously engaging with a local union representative at every stage of the 
conversation; or by the Sales Manager, who stated that one of the workers at the 
brewery was also his neighbour, suggestive of a pre-existing, implicit equality 
between the two despite the asymmetrical salary differentials which now divided 
them. 
This brings us to our second research question, namely to what extent might 
the relationship between subsidiary managers and workers be regarded as 
asymmetrical, founded on a habitus which is no longer shared but dichotomous? 
Habitus, as Bourdieu (1990b: 116) observes, is not set in stone but, on the contrary 
can be transformed and transcended ‘by the effect of a social trajectory leading to 
conditions of living different from initial ones’. As the examples cited above imply, 
the habitus of workers and subsidiary managers which used to be indivisible and 
shared according to the spirit of the traditional Serbian model of ‘social ownership’, 
emerges now as both shared and dichotomous, with the two co-existing in an 
ambivalent fashion. While the workers were displaced, marginalised and 
dysfunctional, the managers required their continued cooperation to shore up their 
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own position, being in need of the workers’ skills and knowledge of the local market. 
The local, subsidiary managers therefore had to pursue something of a double agenda, 
undertaking the cost-cutting measures required of them by senior managers at Eden, 
while maintaining good relations with the workers at Weisser. Workers who had been 
made redundant through cost-cutting measures designed to maximise efficiency were 
therefore regularly re-employed in the enterprise, albeit on a different contractual 
basis. Likewise, cordial relations with the workers were maintained as before, since 
these represented a sine qua non to the ability of the managers to implement the 
cultural shift required by Eden, which required the transference of international 
practices on to the domestic mentality. The degree of cordiality in evidence in the HR 
Manager’s office, for example, as she chatted with an in-house union representative (a 
time-served employee who might well have been at the brewery during the Tito era), 
was an essential prerequisite to securing the workers’ cooperation concerning the 
introduction of the new measures. 
Moreover, while the managers were able to negotiate their patch with the 
parent company, at least to a degree, there is a sense in which the subsidiary managers 
and workers were ‘all in the same boat’, the local managers themselves being also 
relatively low-power actors in the sense implied by Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), 
albeit less so than the workers. The disadvantaged position of workers in the new 
micro-political ‘game’ being played out in the Balkans would suggest that, even in a 
‘red’ joint venture, apparent cultural consonance is partial in its embrace of 
organisational actors, and is powerfully compromised by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation and profit maximisation. Likewise, in a fundamentally stratified world, 
the local managers, although needed by the parent company, may have little 
credibility ultimately with senior managers at Eden, partly because operations at 
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Weisser are so small (Birkinshaw 1999). Though production had increased at the 
brewery, it did not exceed 0.4 million hectoliters annually, less than half of that 
produced by the nearby brewery, Sava, in Zaječar. So while the subsidiary managers 
were clearly able to strengthen their relative position vis-à-vis the parent company by 
having recourse to the various power sources enumerated above, at the same time they 
too were operating under the severe constraints of the volatile Serbian macro-
economic and political environment, where issues to do with the destabilising effects 
of inflation and devaluation and the extradition of war criminals, over which they had 
no control, loomed large over their collective future, undermining their view of their 
own position. 
Nevertheless, what differentiates the local subsidiary managers and workers 
most of all is their ability to escape from the field (Bottero 2004). Ultimately, the 
subsidiary managers have the wherewithal to escape their current fate, through their 
university degrees, language proficiency, international experience, social capital and 
transferable skills. The workers, in salient contrast, being rooted in the field, have far 
fewer options, starkly illustrated by their reemployment on less favourable terms 
following redundancy. This underlines the fundamental asymmetry in the relationship 
between management and workers: while the former had exit options, the only real 
exit option available to the latter was redundancy. 
In January 2008, it was announced that Heineken and Eden were to merge 
their breweries in Serbia from June 2008, forming a new joint venture, Ujedinjene 
Srpske Pivare (United Serbian Breweries), with Heineken becoming a 72 per cent 
majority owner of the joint venture, and Eden having a smaller 28 per cent stake. At 
the same time, it was announced that the brewery at Pančevo would close in October 
2008, its remaining employees being transferred to Sava, its sister subsidiary at 
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Zaječar; a sad end to the oldest brewery in the Balkans, which had survived for almost 
400 years, only to succumb to the hostile winds of change brought by globalisation.  
At the time of our visit to the brewery, productivity, as mentioned, had risen 
and profitability, according to the workers, had also increased. However, where there 
is internal competition for resources from competing subsidiaries, it is not always 
clear how the rules will be interpreted by senior, host company managers. As Morgan 
and Kristensen (2006: 1479) observe: ‘It is a common story in the closure of 
multinationals that the local plant did everything that was asked of it and yet still 
became the victim of the MNC’s axe’. Conformity to the new rules set by the parent 
company does not mean that subsidiary managers will keep their jobs (Dörrenbächer 
2007). Nor does it guarantee survival. Head office support is a necessary condition for 
subsidiary development; but on its own it may not be sufficient (Birkinshaw and 
Hood 1998). ‘Boy Scout’ behaviour on the part of subsidiaries eager to please is as 
likely to result in parent-driven divestment as more ‘subversive’ strategies pursued by 
alleged ‘misfits’ or ‘problem children’ (Boddewyn 1979; Boddewyn 1983; Delany 
1998; Morgan and Kristensen 2006). Parent companies, as Mueller (1996) points out, 
often attempt to play subsidiaries off against one another in pursuit of further 
investment or preferential treatment. Clearly, Eden had demonstrated considerable 
commitment to Weisser in the initial stages of the joint venture, paying the company’s 
debts, installing a transition management team, purchasing new equipment, and so on. 
But centrality to the parent company is not guaranteed in perpetuity, and is bound to 
evolve over time. While some subsidiaries will improve their centrality, strengthening 
their influence vis-à-vis the MNC – perhaps through the use of local and national 
resources to create spaces for local actors to shape events, as illustrated by the two 
other chapters in this section – others will find on the contrary that ‘in the face of 
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changing environmental contingencies… their connections may tend to vanish over 
time’ (Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008: 486). 
Foreign subsidiaries may be established for a number of reasons, as 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) assert; and it is by no means clear that the subsequent 
development of the foreign-owned subsidiary is necessarily viewed as desirable from 
the parent company’s perspective. Subsidiary evolution can lead to the depletion of 
the foreign-owned subsidiary’s capabilities, which may be allowed to atrophy, and 
ultimately to the demise of the subsidiary itself. The dynamics of internal competition 
between individual subsidiaries are a decisive factor in the prosperity or failure of 
individual subsidiaries (Almor and Hirsh 1995). Despite the positive statement by the 
President and CEO of Eden cited earlier in this chapter, namely that Eden intended to 
build on Weisser’s capabilities to ensure that it became a leading brewer in Serbia, it 
is clear that the brewery in Pančevo was competing internally for parent company 
resources with its sister subsidiary in Zaječar from an early stage of the joint venture. 
There was not necessarily any hidden agenda on the part of Eden to merge the two 
sites. Eden had, after all, given the brewery five years to return to profitability. It is 
also unlikely that early integration of the breweries was politically blocked, the 
Serbian government being too weak and impecunious an actor to take such a stance 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). The market for beer was clearly crucial in what 
transpired. Serbia is a small market, and primarily a wine-drinking region to boot, and 
one can surmise that with two sister subsidiaries in close proximity to, and in 
competition with one another, the writing may have been on the wall for some time. 
Weisser was the smaller of the two, producing less than half the volume of beer 
produced by Sava, and equipped with outmoded machinery, with the exception of a 
German pasteurising machine (which the workers claimed was not new, but had been 
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purchased second-hand) and a new bottling machine. An awareness of the other 
subsidiary at Zaječar was constantly present. Notably, both subsidiary managers and 
employees at interview expressed their fear regarding the future: as one union 
representative bluntly put it, ‘We’re scared, we live in hell’. One could argue that the 
seeds of decline were already detectable in the levels of dissonance and suspicion felt 
by the workers; the widening gap between subsidiary managers and employees in 
terms of salaries and status; and the expedient replacement of time-served employees 
with temporary workers, with few rights. 
By the time of the closure of the brewery in October 2008, the numbers of 
employees there had been whittled down to just 30 remaining workers. With many 
former employees displaced and dispossessed by the chill winds of globalisation, our 
Serbian case study emerges as potentially archetypal. The corollary of globalisation is 
frequently a ‘lifting out’ of social relationships from their local contexts (Giddens 
1991), an all too familiar process of disembedding without re-embedding (Bauman 
and Tester 2001), in a world which constantly rescinds on its promises (Bauman and 
Vecchi 2004). In our Serbian case study, this entailed a severing of links with the 
local context and the disconnection of managers and workforce, despite the former 
legacy of worker self-management.  
One question which arises is why some individuals are more likely to become 
the ‘atomized’ subjects – as Bauman puts it – of powerful forces beyond their control, 
while others are better equipped, through education, skills, experience or new 
technology, to emerge as winners in what Habermas (1990) terms the ‘catch-up 
modernisation’. Examination of this issue must be the preserve of future research. 
Nevertheless, it is important to observe that in a post-socialist country such as Serbia, 
which saw rapid and extensive privatisation, the competence of unions remains a 
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concern. Unable to adapt to market liberalism or to withstand unilateral management 
decision-making, untrained in negotiation, losing their membership, yet stuck in the 
mentality of a bygone era, the protection they offered workers was ineffectual, leaving 
a vacuum in terms of worker representation.  
The case study we have presented here provides a poignant illustration of the 
vicissitudes of globalisation. Weisser was not the only Serbian brewery under foreign 
ownership to close in the past few years. It may be the case that Eden effectively 
made use of young, Serbian managers to secure a relatively smooth transition in 
ownership and in the execution of HQ plans. The volatile Serbian context seemingly 
provides limited political resources for local actors to construct a power base they 
could truly exploit. Ultimately, largely due to factors beyond their control – including 
the Serbian market for beer, and decisions being taken elsewhere, in Istanbul or 
Amsterdam – the joint venture failed.  
The dangers of Balkanisation, however, are not limited to the region which 
gave the term its name (Meštrović 1994). Our story doubtless resonates with British 
and American readers in particular. We conclude this chapter with a warning from 
Bauman of what may lie ahead if such issues are not addressed: 
 
And what are the abandoned, desocialized, atomized, lonely individuals likely 
to dream of, and given a chance, do? Once the big harbours have been closed 
or stripped of the breakwaters that used to make them secure, the hapless 
sailors will be inclined to carve out and fence off their own small havens 
where they can anchor and deposit their bereaved, and fragile, identities. No 
longer trusting the public navigation network, they will jealously guard access 
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to such private havens against all and any intruders. (Bauman and Vecchi 
2004: 46). 
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Note 
 
1 The names of case companies and individuals have been changed to preserve 
anonymity. 
                                                 
